
From Centrality to Coordination: Reassessing ASEAN’s Role in Mekong Water Governance Amid U.S.–China Strategic Competition
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.30564/re.v8i4.13573Abstract
The Mekong sub-region has emerged as a critical arena at the intersection of environmental sustainability, water governance, and great-power competition. Home to a large population dependent on the basin’s water resources and constituting one of the world’s most biodiverse ecosystems, the Mekong River Basin is increasingly shaped by external powers—notably China through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC), and the United States through the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) and the Mekong–U.S. Partnership (MUSP). Drawing on systematic literature review and comparative policy analysis, this article examines the strategic adjustments made since 2016 and their implications for ASEAN. Using the Funan Techo Canal project in Cambodia and Cambodia’s withdrawal from the Cambodia–Laos–Vietnam Development Triangle Area (CLV-DTA) as its central case study, the paper demonstrates that the challenges of Mekong water governance stem from structural institutional asymmetries between upstream and downstream states, compounded by deepening fragmentation among ASEAN member states. The findings indicate that ASEAN can integrate sustainability into Mekong governance, but doing so requires clarifying project classification criteria, establishing new sub-regional coordination mechanisms, and strengthening independent monitoring capacity—rather than relying on declaratory cooperation alone.
Keywords:
Mekong Sub-Region; ASEAN; United States; China; Water Governance; Strategic Competition; Institutional AsymmetryReferences
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Copyright © 2026 Nguyen Huy Hoang, Ha Le Huyen, Le Thi Thanh Tam

This is an open access article under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) License.





Nguyen Huy Hoang